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The  effects of money  supply responses  to  both the current interest rate and 
the lagged state of the economy  are analyzed  in  a dynamic  IS-LM  model  with 
multiperiod wage  stickiness.  Allowing private agents  to  use  the current 
interest rate in  forming expectations  creates  some  potentially counter- 
intuitive effects of shocks,  but leaves policy implications  largely 
unaffected.  A  conflict between  firm-level and  aggregate-level  output 
stabilization is found  to  be  inherent  in  the multiperiod wage  contracting 
scheme.  Policy rules that stabilize output or serve other objectives are 
explicitly derived.  Because of supply  shocks,  procycl i  cal money  growth may  be 
required to  stabilize firm  output,  prices,  real  wages,  or output relative to 
its  full-information level. 
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I. Introduction 
This article reconsiders the role of  monetary policy in  a Keynesian model 
that incorporates rational expectations and  displays  the natural  rate 
property.  Important features are multiperiod wage  stickiness and  the 
availability,  to  both private agents  and  the policymaker,  of current 
information from observations of the nominal  interest rate.  The  model  is 
essentially a log-linearized version of that of Fischer  (1977),  augmented  by 
an  (implicit) economy-wide  credit market.  As  in  Fischer's influential paper, 
feedback from the lagged  state of the economy  is consequential  for output 
behavior because  of the conjunction of multiperiod wage  stickiness and 
autocorrelation of shocks.  At the same  time,  because  of incomplete current 
information,  policy responses  to the current interest rate are also of 
consequence  for output,  as  in  the famous  analysis of Poole  (1970). 
The  analysis of this article is  of interest from three different 
standpoints.  First, it  addresses  the analytical problem of current 
information sets under  rational expectations.  The  analysis finds that private 
use  of current information from the interest rate to  update expectations does 
not necessarily have  the dramatic  implications for  policy that Dotsey and  King 
(1983,  1986)  obtain in  completely flexible-price models.  In  particular,  while 
policy responses  to the interest rate are irrelevant for output in 
flexible-price  models,  such  responses  are potentially important influences on 
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the behavior of  output  in sticky-wage models. 
Second,  this article extends  the classic analysis of  optimal policy under 
uncertainty,  inaugurated  by  Poole,  to  an  expanded  IS-LM model  in  which prices 
are not fixed,  the natural  rate proposition holds,  and  supply  shocks  occur. 
Surprisingly,  policy rules to stabilize output,  or to serve other objectives, 
in  models  with plausible specifications of  commodity  supply behavior 
apparently have  not heretofore  been  derived. 
A  third reason  this article is  of  interest is  that it  treats the problem 
of inconsistency between  three potential  policy objectives:  (1)  stabilization 
of total output,  (2)  stabilization of  typical individual firm  output,  and  (3) 
stabilization of output around  its perfect  foresight or full-information 
level.  The  inconsistency between  the first  and  second  objectives has  not been 
noted before,  and  is  inherent in  the staggered wage  contracting setup.  The 
conflict between  the first  and  third objectives has  been  noted before,  but its 
implications for policy rules in  sticky-wage models  have  not been  developed  as 
fully  as  in  this article.  The  appropriate response  of policy to  a commodity 
supply  shock  will depend  on which objective is  embraced.  If the third 
objective is  chosen,  money  should be  increased in  response  to  supply  shocks, 
and  the same  may  also be  true under  the second objective.  Numerical  examples 
show  that the behavior of  money  appropriate  to  either of these objectives  can 
easily involve a positive correlation between money  and  output. 
In  studying the effects of  private agents'  use  of current information from 
the interest rate,  this article joins Barro (1980),  King  (1983),  Canzoneri, 
Henderson,  and  Rogoff  (1983),  and  Dotsey  and  King (1983,  1986).  These  prior 
studies make  simplifying assumptions  to render the analysis tractable, 
including,  most  importantly,  limits on policy alternatives,  allowance for only 
a  few economic  disturbances,  or  both.  Even  these  simplifications have  not 
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closed-form solutions without  imposing any  arbitrary restrictions on monetary 
policy,  enabling derivation and  qualitative characterization of  policies that 
satisfy various objectives.  Also,  the analysis here  includes  three distinct 
aggregate  disturbances,  for commodity  supply,  commodity  demand,  and money 
demand. 
The  expectational  effects of current observation of the interest rate 
create the potential  for counterintuitive responses  of the economy  to  some 
disturbances.  For  example,  a positive shock  to  the money  supply may  reduce 
output and  prices.  However,  in  contrast to the other studies,  this article 
finds that current information does  not appear  to  change  the behavior of 
output  in  the model  in a way  that is likely to  be  quantitatively important, 
nor  does  it  seem  to  have  very important or surprising implications for 
monetary policy.  The  conclusions and  intuitions of Poole and  Fischer 
concerning output-stabilizing policy-need  not be  importantly affected by  the 
presence of current information. 
11.  Review  of  Recent  Literature 
This  section presents  a stylized perspective of the literature on  policy 
effectiveness,  rational expectations,  current information,  and  sticky-wage 
models  as  they relate to  the issues of this article. 
A  major  problem in  rational expectations macroeconomic  models  is that, if 
private agents  have  partial information about  the current state of the 
economy,  then unambiguous  qualitative conclusions  about  the effects of 
monetary policy are often difficult to deduce.  Indeed,  unless  the structure 
of the model  is severely restricted, it  is  often difficult to derive 
analytical  solutions to the model.  From  the standpoint of  monetary  policy 
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analysis,  the problem of  contemporaneous  information appears  especially 
critical for whether  or how  money  supply responses  to  the nominal  interest 
rate affect the behavior of output and  other variables of concern. 
Traditionally,  as  in  Poole  (1970),  the monetary  authority has  been  assumed 
to  use  the current  interest rate as  well  as  delayed information on  the  state 
of the economy  in setting the money  supply.  An  optimal  policy generally takes 
the form 
mt=qRt+pSt-,, 
where  m,  is  the money  stock,  R,  is the current nominal  interest rate,  and 
St-,  is the lagged  state of the economy.  q and  p are policy response 
coefficients relating the money  supply to  current and  lagged  information.  In 
Poole's analysis,  the relevance of q--the response  of  policy to  the interest 
rate--arises from the policymaker's  incomplete  information concerning the 
state of the economy,  while the relevance of p--the  response  of  policy to 
the lagged state of the economy--arises  from autocorrelation in  economic 
shocks,  together  with implicit,  perfectly elastic supply  behavior  (fixed 
prices).  Poole's  particular contribution was  to  explicitly relate structural 
parameter  and  stochastic assumptions  to  the characteristics of a  stabilization 
pol  icy. 
Sargent and  Wallace  (1975),  in  a model  that introduced an  explicit supply 
sector,  brought  the relevance of  g into question,  but preserved  the 
relevance of q.'  They  imposed  rational expectations on  private agents,  who 
used  St-,,  the lagged  state,  but not R,,  the current interest rate,  as 
information in  forming expectations  of future prices.  Private agents  knew 
R,  but did -  not use it  to  update  inflation expectations.  The  relevance of q 
in  the model  of Sargent and  Wallace  depended on  this violation of  Muthian 
rational expectations:  agents  wasted  available information contained in  the 
interest rate. 
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Subsequently, Barro  (1976)  demonstrated that policy effectiveness in 
then-extant macromodels with the natural rate property generally depended on 
superior information of the policymaker relative to private agents.  It seemed 
that, unless the policymaker knew more than private agents, both q and p 
would be irrelevant for the behavior of output.  Because private agents do 
actually have equal access to information on current interest rates and to 
virtually the same information on the lagged state of the economy, the 
relevance of monetary policy appeared dubious. 
Subsequently, King  (1983)  and Dotsey and King  (1983,  1986) found that, via 
a mechanism involving private, heterogeneous information sets that included 
local  prices as well  as the global interest rate, policy was an effective 
determinant of  output behavior after all .'  But only money-supply responses 
to the past state of the economy, p,  were effective; q was irrelevant for 
real variables.  Dotsey and King argued that rational expectations 
dramatically reverses the conclusions of Poole on the relevance of q,  and also 
reverses the conclusions of Sargent and Wallace on the irrelevance of p. 
However, p is relevant via a very different mechanism than envisioned  by 
Poole.  Also, the heterogeneous information mechanism creates analytical 
intractabilities and ambiguities that prevent derivation of explicit solutions 
for the model or qualitative knowledge of how various values of p would 
influence economic outcomes, making it difficult to design appropriate 
state-dependent money rules.  Certainly, Dotsey and King's results provided no 
basis for conventional  countercyclical  policies, and indeed were used to 
suggest that rational  expectations destroys the case for  such policies. 
However, these provocative arguments of Sargent and Wallace, Barro, King, 
and Dotsey concerning policy were illustrated in flexible wage and price 
models, in which output deviations from optimal levels were due strictly to 
incomplete information.  Fischer  (1977)  showed that the relevance of p for 
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output behavior  follows from the assumption  that wages  are sticky for longer 
than  the global  information lag,  or for at least two periods.  However, 
lacking a credit market,  the interest rate did not enter Fischer's model,  so 
that the relevance of q  could not be  assessed. 
Canzoneri,  Henderson,  and  Rogoff  (1983)  added  further ambiguity  to the 
issue of whether  q  and  g were  relevant.  Given  that wages  are  sticky for  one 
period and  that agents  making  demand  decisions  ("investors") use  all the 
information contained  in  the current  interest rate,  Canzoneri,  et al. derive 
two  sets of values  for (q,p)  that result in  the minimum output variance: 
one  of these  has  (q=O,  g#O),  while the other has  (q#O,  ~=0>.~ 
In  the next  section,  a model  is  presented with two-period wage  contracts 
that makes  both q  and  relevant,  and  in  much  the same  way  as  in  the 
analysis of Poole,  despite the addition of rational  expectations,  information 
sets  that include the current interest rate,  a supply sector  that displays the 
natural rate property,  and  supply shocks.  In  effect,  the analysis  invokes 
Fischer's multiperiod wage  stickiness to  rescue Poole's policy from 
vulnerability to the ineffectiveness propositions arising from recent work  in 
expectations formation.  Although Fischer himself  has  already done  so  with 
regard to  p, the more  recent arguments  concerning contemporaneous 
information  require that the relevance of  q be  reexamined. 
111.  A  Prototype Keynesian Model 
The  particular model  was  chosen  to implement  three major  characteristics 
as  straightforwardly as  possible.  First,  the model  generates  a substantial 
role for countercyclical monetary policy via a Keynesian multiperiod 
sticky-wage mechanism.  Second,  it  incorporates  an  equilibrium wage  dynamic 
and  does  not rely on money  illusion,  persistent expectational  biases,  or 
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natural rate property:  mean  values of  real variables are invariant with 
respect to  monetary  factors, i  ncl  udi  ng monetary  pol  icy.  Third,  the model 
possesses  an  implicit economy-wide  credit market  that clears simultaneously 
with the commodity  market,  as  in the IS-LM  model,  introducing the interest 
rate as  a variable that is jointly endogenous  with other real and  nominal 
variables.  This  facilitates analysis of  monetary policies that condition the 
money  supply on  the interest rate,  as  in  Poole's  (1970)  famous  analysis. 
These  three features are implemented  by  combining  the dynamic  IS-LM model  with 
the supply  sector of  Fischer  (1977)  and  by  imposing rational expectations. 
The  output supply  sector  is a straightforward  log-linear adaptation of 
Fischer's.  Firms  decide upon  output after observing current prices and  taking 
into account  predetermined  wages,  set either one  or two periods ago.  To  fix 
ideas,  and  without  loss of generality,  the economy  can  be  seen  as  composed  of 
two groups  of firms.  The  first  group consists of firms signing contracts at 
the end  of period t-1,  and  the second  group  consists of firms that signed 
contracts  at the end of period t-2.  Any  particular firm  will be  in  group one 
in  the first  year of its contract and  in  group  two  in the second  year.  For 
example,  the contract signed by  a firm  at the end  of  period t-2 provided for 
wages  in t-1,  when it  was  a group one  firm,  and  for wages  in t, when  it  is a 
group  two  firm.  Likewise,  the contract signed at the end  of  period t-1 
provides  for group one  wages  in  period t and  for group  two wages  in  period 
t+l. Wages  are always  set to  match  the expected  price level,  thus  attempting 
to  stabilize real wages  in the face  of uncertain inflation.  This  scheme  calls 
for wages  to  change  for every firm in  each  period,  but only the most  recently 
contracting firms,  group one,  have  wages  that reflect knowledge of the state 
of the economy  in  period t-1.  Furthermore,  no wages  are adjusted in  immediate 
response  to  contemporaneous  shocks,  but only after a new  contract is signed. 
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Equations  (2)  state these assumptions  formally. 
w~,~-~=E~-~~~-~  and  wZt=Et-,pt; 
WI t=Et-lpt  and  w,,t+l=E,-lpt+l; 
where  wit is the log of the nominal  wage  at group i firms 
and  pt is the log of  the price level. 
Firms  are assumed  to  have  a constant,  positive elasticity of supply  with 
respect  to  real wages.  Formally,  firm  supply functions are: 
Yi t  =  a+fi(pt-wit>+ut,  i=1,2,  R>O,  (3) 
where  yi is  output of  group i,  and  ut is an  economy-wide  supply  shock. 
The  preservation of linearity of the model  is  achieved by approximating  the 
log of the sum  of group outputs as: 
yt=ko+(l/2>(ylt+yZt>.  (4) 
Finally,  a supply function or Phi 11  ips Curve  that relates output to 
price-level surprises  is  found from combining  (2>,  (3),  and  (4): 
yt =  (ko+a)+(l/2>fi~:,l(pt-E~-,p~)+~~.  (5) 
The  key feature of the supply function (4)  is that output responds  equal ly  to 
deviations of the price level from its expectation formed  both one  and  two 
periods ago,  when  contracts currently in  effect were  signed. 
The  commodity  demand  (or  IS) equation,  (6),  reflects the assumption  that 
the commodity  market  and  the credit market  clear simultaneously in  the sense 
that agents  know  the economy-wide  interest rate and  the current price in  their 
local market when  making  demand  decisions.  Demand  depends  on  the (ex  ante) 
real rate of interest. 
yt =  bo-b~CRt-(E:-~pt+~-pt>l+~t  (6) 
where 
E:-~P~+~  =  EC~~+~  Inti,  (7) 
n,  =  observable  state of  economy  at time t 
=  {Rt;St-I), 
and  S  =  state vector  (given  a specific identity in the next section). 
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The  nominal  interest rate,  Rt,  is measured  as  the natural  logarithm of unity 
plus the coupon  rate of return.  The  future price expectation, 
Ei-lpt,l,  is conditioned on  the observed state of the economy,  at, 
an  information set that includes  the current economy-wide  interest rate,  R,, 
6  and  the lagged  state vector,  St-l.  Et-,p,+,  can  differ from 
E,-~P~+~  because  agents  are permitted to  know  the nominal  interest rate to 
update  their inflation expectations.  xt is  a stochastic  demand  shock. 
Money  demand i  s  conventional . 
mt-pt  =  a.  -alRt+azyt+vt,  (8) 
where  v,  is  a random disturbance. 
Monetary policy is characterized by a decision rule for the quantity of 
money  as  a function of the observed state of  the economy,  or a money  supply 
rule.  The  simplest adequate  form of this rule is 
mt=qRt+po+plut-l+prvt-1+p3~t-l.  (9) 
The  shocks  u,  v,  and  x  are  first-order autoregressive  processes  with 
innovations  E,  q,  and  X,  respectively.  All shocks  are mutually 
uncorrelated. 
/L 
ut=plut-l+ct,  O<pl<l, E,  N(O,u:)  - 
vt=prvt-I+qt,  O<pr<l, qt N(O,oG) 
Xt=p3Xt-  l+Xt,  O<p3<1,  A~N(o,U:) 
E(E,Q,)=E(~,X,  )=E(E  ,At  )=O 
E(ctrt~l)=E(~tq,~l)=E(XtXtt,)=O,  i>O. 
IV.  Analysis of the Model 
Although the model  is extremely simple,  the conjunction of  contemporaneous 
information  and  rational expectations makes  the  solution rather complex.  Many 
uncouth details of the solution method  are banished  to  an  appendix,  but some 
fundamental  points are discussed  in  the  text of this section. 
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A.  The  Endogenous  Variables  and  the State Vector 
The  endogenous  variables of essential  concern  are total output,  group  1 
and  group  2  output,  the price level,  the money  stock,  and  the  interest rate 
(yt, ylt, yrt, p,,  m,,  and  R,).  Using the method  of undetermined 
coefficients,  each  endogenous  variable  will be  assigned  its  own  trial equation 
in terms  of the state vector.  From  these  trial equations are derived implied 
linear reduced-form equations  for the endogenous  expectations  variables, 
Et-lpt,  Et-rpt,  and  EL-lpt+l. 
The  state vector is determined as  follows.  First, obvious  candidates for 
inclusion are all predetermined  and  exogenous  variables explicitly appearing 
in the structural equations,  including the autoregressive processes  (9). 
These  are the  lagged  level of structural  disturbances,  u,-,,  v,-,,  and 
xt-, , and  the current innovations,  d,,  q,,  and  A,.  A  unit "variable" 
is also included among  the  state vector to  allow for intercepts in the 
reduced-form equations.  (The  constants are of no  interest for cyclical 
analysis and  will not appear  beyond  this section.)  The  appearance of  the 
predetermined prior expectations,  Et-,ut-,,  Et-2vt-l,  and 
Et-,x  t-l,  is required even  though  they do not appear  explicitly in the 
structural equations.  This  is because,  if the state vector of the trial 
solution does  not include these  terms,  then the required identities cannot 
hold. '  Expectations formed  two periods ago  generally matter  for the 
endogenous  variables because  of the existence of contracts made  two periods 
ago,  based on  then-available information. 
This appearance of predetermined  prior expectations of the exogenous  shock 
processes  raises the question of why  the policy equation of  the previous 
section was  able  to  omit these  artificial state variables.  The  reason is 
that,  under  any  of the policy criteria examined  in  this article, money  supply 
coefficients on  these  state variables are redundant and,  hence,  their values 
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are indeterminate.  They have been arbitrarily set to zero in this study in 
order to determine the policy vector uniquely and to simplify analysis.  If it 
were desired to study policies directed toward a mixed or compound 
objective--such as both output and price stability, or policies to stabilize 
both interest rates and prices--then the pol  icy rule should generally include 
nonzero coefficients on Et-rut-l,  Et-,vt-l,  and Et-2~t-l. 
Thus, the conclusion is that the state vector 
St={ut-I,  vt-1, xt-1;  ~t,  ~t,  At; Et-2ut-1, Et-2vt-1, Et-2xt-1) 
is adequate to describe the position of the system, ruling out bootstraps. 
Table 1  provides a glossary of  endogenous and state variables that will 
appear in the trial solution. 
B.  The Trial Solution 
Then the trial solution includes the following equations.  (11)  through  (16) 
are implications of the assumed linearity and of the state vector St.  (17) 
and  (18) are direct implications of  (13). 











+  n7Et-2~t-l+n8Et-2~t-,+~9Et-fit-1 
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TABLE  1 
GLOSSARY  OF  VARIABLES  IN  THE  TRIAL  SOLUTION 
ENDOGENOUS  VARIABLES 
y,.  Log  of total output 
y I ,  . Log  of  output of group one 
y,,.  Log  of output of group  two 
pt.  Log  of price level 
m,.  Log of  money  stock 
R,.  Log  of  [I  +  nominal  interest rate1 
Endogenous  Expectations 
Et-~p,=E[ptlS,-~ I, i=1,2.  (Prior expectations of p,) 
E;-lpt+,=ECpt+1  l~,l=ECp~+~  lRt  ,Sttl I. (Updated  expectation of pt+l) 
STATE  VARIABLES 
Predetermined 
u.  Observed  level of aggregate  supply 
v,.  Observed  level of  money  demand 
x.  Observed  level of aggregate demand 




E,.  Innovation to  aggregate  supply 
qt.  Innovation to  money  demand 
1,.  Innovation to  aggregate demand 
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E~-IP~=~I~O+~I~~U~-~+~I~~V~-~+~~~X~-~+~I~~E~U~+E~V~+~IE-X-  (17) 
E~-,P~=II~~+(II~  l+If3r)Et-~t-  1+(n3z+fl38)Et-2Vt-1+(fl33+n3q)Et-zXt-1  (18) 
The  derivation of the trial solution for E:Llpt  deserves  special 
comment.  This expectation  is composed  of two orthogonal  components: 
E:-lpt+l=Et-lpt+I+CE:-Ipt+  I-Et-lpt+~l.  (19) 
The  first component of  (19)  is the prior expectation of next period's price 
level,  which  is  conditioned on  last period's full realization of the  state of 
the economy,  St-1.  Using  (131,  and  the assumptions  about  the error 
processes,  (lo),  this is seen  to  be 
Et-lpt+l=f130+~l  (n3  1+n37)~t-I+~2(~32+f138)~t-l+~3(~33+f139)~t-l~  (20) 
The  second  component of  (19)  is the revision to the future-price expectation 
that occurs after agents observe  the current nominal  interest rate,  Rt. 
This  second  term,  then,  constitutes an  updating of the future price 
expectation based  on  the information content of the nominal  interest rate. 
From  the  trial solution specification (131,  it  is  clear that the influence of 
current (period-t)  shocks  on  pt+l  must  be 
(pt+l-Et-Ipt+l)  =  (n31~t+rI32~t+n33Xt).  (21) 
The  expectation of this component  of the future price level formed at time  t-1 
is clearly zero.  But at time t, agents  can  condition this component  on  the 
innovation in  the nominal  interest rate, 
(Rt-Et-,Rt)=(ns,~t+rI~s~t+rIsbXt).  (22) 
The  future price expectation updating coefficient, 
e=d[E:-lpt+~-Et-lpt+ll/d[Rt-Et-lRtl,  is essentially the  slope of  the 
least-squares regression line relating (pt+l-Et-lpt+l)  to (R,-Et-IRt). 
E{Cpt+l-Et-Ipt+l l[Rt-Et-IRtI} 
8  = .............................. 
E[Rt-Et-IRtlz 
(n3  1~54~:+n3  z~s  5~G+f13  3~5  60;) 
= ............................ 
(n:,o:+n:  so:+~:  ,u:> 
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Then  the updated  future price expectation is 
ELP,+  l=n30+pl(n3  1+n37)~t-1+p2(n32+n38)~t-,+~3(n33+n39)~t-l 
+@(n54~t+nssqt+ns,lt).  (24) 
The  effect of the assumption  that agents  use  the information content of 
the interest rate is to  add  the @-term,  with 8  defined by  (23>,  to  the 
right-hand side of  (24).  The  effect of the assumption  can  be  seen  in  the 
solution for the model,  in  the presence of 8. 
C.  General  Properties 
The  appendix  presents  the identities among  n-coefficients  implied by the 
structure,  the solutions for these  coefficients,  and  the final form solution 
of the model.  These  solutions,  (A.18)  through  (A.21),  reflect some  important 
general  properties of the model,  due  to its two-period Fischer contracts.  The 
effect of  money  demand  or  commodity  demand  shocks  two periods or more  earlier 
is  only on  the nominal  variables such  as  the price level,  p,,  nominal  wages, 
w,,  the interest rate,  R,,  and  the money  stock,  m,,  and  not on real variables 
such  as  output,  y,,  the real rate of interest,  CRt-(E:-IPt+l-P,)I,  and  real 
wages,  w, ,-p,,  i=1,2.  Group  one  output,  y, ,, is  determined by  the entire 
history of commodity  supply  innovations,  {E,):=-,,  and  on period-t money 
demand  and  commodity  demand  innovations,  q,  and  A,.  But ylt is  unaffected  by 
anticipated levels of money  demand  and  commodity  demand  shocks,  and  hence  is 
independent of lagged values of q  and  A.  Simi  larly, group two  output,  y2  ,,  is 
determined by  the entire history of  commodity  supply innovations and  on 
period-t and  (t-1)  money  demand  and  commodity  demand  innovations:  q,,  Q,-~, 
A,,  and  At-l.  The  effects of  each  innovation on nominal  variables die out, 
beyond  the  second  lag,  geometrically with a rate of decay  strictly dependent 
on  the appropriate autocorrelation coefficient. 
Pol  icy parameters  {q  ,p2  ,p,)  are a1 1 general  ly  consequenti  a1  for  the 
behavior of output.  Monetary  policy can  influence  the output effects  of 
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in the previous period (t-1).  It is infeasible for monetary  policy to  affect 
the component  of the business  cycle due  to  supply  shocks  after their price 
level implications become  reflected in  all wage  contracts  (two periods). 
Hence,  supply  shocks  occurring in t-j, j>l,  have  effects on  real variables, 
including output,  that policy cannot  modify.  Money  supply  shocks  or control 
errors need  not be  formally introduced into the model;  they have  effects 
identical  in  magnitude  but opposite  in  sign to  money  demand  shocks.  Constant 
terms  can  also be  excluded  from further consideration,  since  they have  no 
implications for cyclical behavior. 
V.  Constant Money  Supply 
Examining  the hypothetical  constant-money  case  helps make  the model's 
properties more  transparent.  It is  useful  to  review the familiar properties 
of conventional  IS-LM-type  models  under  a constant money  policy.  Usually, 
commodity  supply  shocks  have  positive effects  on output and  negative effects 
on prices.  Commodity  demand  shocks  have  positive effects on output,  prices, 
and  the interest rate.  Money  demand  shocks  have  positive effects on  the 
interest rate,  but negative effects on output and  prices.  The  model  can  be 
regarded as  displaying these usual  properties of  IS-LM  models  in  a very broad 
and  general  way.  However,  some  of the signs of coefficients of the final  form 
are formally  ambiguous,  and  some  anomalous  cases  are plausible. 
In  the model  at hand,  under  the constant money  policy, 
{q,pl  ,p2  ,p2)=0,  the solution for prices,  output,  and  the interest rate 
reduces  to  the equations  below. 
mJ  yt={l-BCal+a2bl(l-8)lJ}~t+p1  11-B(l+al )(al+a2bl )GI 
-blB(1-B)Jqt-blBp2(1+al)G2~t-l+BalJX,+Ral~l+al~p3G3At-l 
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and 
where 
(I-a2bl  )(al+a2bl )Glplo~ 
Z=2(l+al )  -bl (bl+B)G2p20G 
+al ( l+azB)G3pso: 
and  { 
c  =  (l-a2bl~2u~+(bl+~~2u~+(l+a2~)20~>0. 
Some  preliminary analysis of  8  and  Z  will facilitate understanding the 
behavior of this system.  The  future price expectation updating coefficient, 
8,  will take the  sign of the term in the  large brackets  in the definition of 
Z,  (31).  Z  can  be  positive or negative,  and  generally depends  on  all of the 
parameters of the system,  including error variances.  For  example,  Z,  hence 
0,  is  more  likely to  be  positive if the variance and  autocorrelation in 
money  demand  shocks,  and  p,,  are large relative to  the variance  and 
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autocorrelation of commodity  demand  shocks,  o<  and  p3.  8  is  more 
likely to  be  positive if the elasticity of commodity  demand  with respect  to 
the real interest rate,  b,,  is large,  and if the product of this elasticity 
and  the income  elasticity of  money  demand,  a,b,,  exceeds  unity.  Finally, 
the effect on 8 of the elasticity of money  demand  with respect to  the 
nominal  interest rate,  a,,  depends  on  the relative sizes of shocks  and  on 
other parameters.  In  most  reasonable  cases,  however,  increases  in al are 
associated with increases  in  8. 
In  extreme  cases,  8  may  not only be  positive,  but greater than unity. 
8>1 iff a,(b,+B)Z>E.  (33) 
Because  the condition (33)  involves Z  multiplicatively,  the likelihood of this 
case  may  be  enhanced  by  the same  structural conditions  just mentioned  as 
determining the  sign of  8 and  Z.  The  potential  importance of high values of 
the elasticity of money  demand,  a,,  is seen  in the fact that for some  al 
sufficiently high,  8  will exceed unity.  But  an  upper  bound  can  be  placed on 
8.  The  definitions of J  and 8  can  be  manipulated  to  show  that, given 
E>O (since  E is a weighted  sum  of the disturbance  variances,  it  is 
necessarily positive),  J>O and 
8  <  l+al(bl+B)/bl(l+a2B)  L l+allarbl 
(using az /  I). 
These  inequalities help determine signs of  total derivatives, or 
coefficients in the final form.  If  8>1,  then money  demand  or supply  shocks 
will have  anti-intuitive effects on  the price level and  output.  For  example, 
an  increase  in  money  demand  under  this constant money  policy will  actually 
increase  the price level and  output in the contemporaneous  period.  In  the 
following period,  and  beyond,  the effect on prices and  output is  negative. 
The  effect of agents'  use  of the interest rate to  update  future price 
expectations  can  be  illustrated with a hypothetical  temporary  increase  in  the 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper
Best available copy-1 8- 
money  supply of one  unit at time t.  (This  shock  has  the same  effects  as  a 
one-unit decrease  in  money  demand,  I-,,=-].>  The  interest rate,  Rt, 
unambiguously  falls by  (bl+R>J.  The  expected future price level, 
E:-lpt+l,  is changed  by  the same  amount  times 8,  which  can  be 
positive or negative.  The  current price level,  pt, changes  by  bl  (1-8>J, 
which  can  be  negative if  8>1.  The  expected rate of inflation, 
[E:-lpt+l-ptl,  changes  by  -(b1+88>J, which  is  negative unless 
8<-(bl lR>.  The  real rate of interest,  r,=CR,-(Ef  -lpt+  l-pt >I,  changes  by 
-R(1-8>J,  which  is  negative unless 8>1. 
If the real  interest rate declines  in  response  to  a temporary  money 
increase,  then aggregate  demand  increases,  which  is associated with higher 
current prices and  output.  The  counterintuitive case,  in  which  the real 
interest rate increases  with a money  supply  shock,  arises if the necessary 
decline in the nominal  interest rate is  overshadowed  by  an  even  larger decline 
in  inflation expectations based  on observation of that interest-rate decline. 
In  the borderline case  of 8=1,  observed rises in  R,  generate equal  rises 
in  E:-lp,+l,  so  that inflation expectations rise by an  amount  equal  to 
the rise in the nominal  interest rate.  Therefore,  the real rate,  output,  and 
the current price level are unchanged.  If 8>1,  then observed  rises in Rt 
are associated with larger rises in E:-lpt+,  , so  that expected 
inflation rises by more  than the rise in the nominal  interest rate.  Then, 
real rates fall with observed positive innovations  in  the nominal  rate, 
increasing aggregate demand  and  raising output and  the current price level. 
It is interesting to  consider  that,  under  a simple elastic money-supply 
policy,  such  as  m,=qRt,  8  will eventually exceed  unity as  q is increased 
without  limit.  (Such  a policy might be  motivated by  a naive effort to 
stabilize the interest rate,  although  this method  of doing so  would  be 
unnecessari ly  costly in  terms  of other potenti  a1  objectives.)  Then  money 
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demand  and  supply shocks  would have  counterintuitive effects on prices and 
output. 
The  importance of the cases  of counterintuitive contemporaneous  effects of 
shocks  is inherently limited by  the structure of the model.  If the sum  of the 
elasticities of money  supply and  money  demand,  al+q,  is  high enough,  these 
cases  arise.  But,  then,  money  supply and  demand  shocks  have  little 
c'ontemporaneous  effect on output,  as  can  be  seen  by  noting that the 
coefficient J  in the reduced  forms  approaches  zero as  al+q rises without 
limit.  So,  if al+q is  high enough  to create anti-intuitive responses  of 
output and  the price level to  money  shocks,  then  these responses  will tend to 
be  small.  Likewise,  these cases  can  arise due  to  a preponderance  of commodity 
demand  shocks  relative to  money  demand  and  money  supply shocks.  But  then,  by 
hypothesis,  the influences  that create the anti-intuitive effects are 
relatively small. 
Beyond  the contemporaneous  period,  the effect of  an  innovation on  any 
endogenous  variable depends,  not on 8,  nor  on  relative sizes of error 
variances,  but strictly on  structural  elasticities and  on  autocorrelation 
coefficients of shocks.  The  most  surprising possibility is that output can 
fall in  the wake  of a positive supply  innovation.  Formally, 
dy,/d~,-~<O  iff 
Cl+a,(l-pl)lCB(al+a2bl~+2bl(l+al)l  <  B(l+al)pl(al+arbl). 
8  (35) 
The  behavior of the interest rate in  response  to  shocks  displays several 
interesting characteristics.  The  effect of  all innovations on  the nominal 
interest rate is generally nonzero  at all lags,  although it  dies out at fixed 
rates,  beyond  the second  lag,  that depend  strictly on  the pi.  The  effect 
of supply innovations on  the interest rate is ambiguous.  This  effect  of 
supply innovations  in  the contemporaneous  period is  negative if the product of 
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the income  elasticity of money  demand,  al,  and  the real interest rate 
elasticity of commodity  demand,  bl,  is less  than unity,  but positive if 
albl>l.  At  one  lag,  supply  innovations may  raise or lower  the interest 
rate.  If pl is near  unity,  I3  is large,  or az is small,  then  this effect 
is  more  likely to  be  negative. 
Although money  demand  innovations unambiguously raise the interest rate 
contemporaneously,  they may  actually decrease  the  interest rate in the 
subsequent  period.  Such  a case  is  fostered by  high autocorrelation,  pr, 
and  high values  of  a,  and  b, . 
The  influence of  private agents'  use  of the current interest rate to 
update  inflation expectations  is seen  in the presence  of  8  in  the solution 
equations.  If agents did not use  the interest rate,  the economy  would  behave 
as if 8 were  zero in  the  solution equations.  Obviously,  the influence of 
agents'  use  of the interest rate is small if 8 is reasonably  close to zero, 
as  will be  illustrated with a numerical  example.  The  differences in  the 
behavior of the system under  the alternative assumptions  about  private 
information pertain strictly to the contemporaneous  effects of  innovations. 
The  effect of current supply  innovations on output,  dy,/ds,,  is smaller 
if private agents  use  the  information content of the interest rate, if  and 
only if the sign of [(I-a2bl>B1  is negative.  The  effect  of current 
money  demand  innovations on output,  dyt/dq,,  is  always  negative if 
agents  do not use  R,,  but can  be  positive if agents  use  Rt  and  8>1.  If 
8~0,  then the absolute magnitude of the output effect  of  money  demand  shocks 
is  magnified.  The  effect of current demand  innovations on  output, 
dytldXt,  is always  positive.  It is increased for 8>0 if agents  use 
R,  in  expectation formation. 
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The  economy-wide  output  stabilization policy involves  feedback from  the 
current interest rate and  past economic  shocks  in  a manner  that is broadly 
consistent with the well-known  analyses  of Poole  and  Fischer. 
In  deriving this policy, it  will be  easier  to  begin by  noting that the 
effects on output of innovations of  more  than one  period ago  cannot  be 
modified by policy.  t-2 or earlier supply  innovations will have  full impact, 
while distant demand  and money  demand  innovations have  no  effect.  Then 
n7=n8=n9=0  in  equation  (16).  Stabilization policy operates  by 
minimizing the effects of t and  t-1  innovations.  It  is  clear from (16)  that 
t-1  shocks  are prevented from influencing yt if 111=112=113=0,  or 
nl=[p1+(1/2)R~3  1=0,  112=(1  /2)01132=0,  and  l13=(1/2)8n33=0,  (36) 
using the relevant equations  among  (A.1>,  (A.2>,  and  (A.6)  in  the appendix. 
(36)  requires  the following relations between  the pi and  q,  in view of the 
expressions  for n3,,  n,,,  and  ns3  among  equations  (A.10). 
The  contribution of period-t shocks  to  output variance  cannot  be 
eliminated,  but is  minimized,  given the Gaussian  stochastic assumption, if  the 
expectation of the output innovation is zero.  Given availability of  current 
observations  on  the  interest rate,  this implies  that output and  interest rate 
innovations  will be  uncorrelated,  or 
2  COVC(yt-Et-lyt)  ,(Rt-Et-  1 Rt)I =  n4ns4~~+fl~ll5s~~+ll6fl5~ 
=(fin34+l )fl54~;+0& SnS  SU~+BII~~~~S~U~  =  0-  (38) 
The  substitution of n3i  terms  for  ni terms  in (38)  uses  the relevant 
equations  among  (A.1>,  (A.2),  and  (A.6).  (38)  can,  with the model,  be  used  to 
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(A.7)  for  n4, n,,  and  n6.  There  are also three equations  in (~.12)  for  ns4, 
n5,,  and  ri56. Together  with the definition of  8,  (23),  these  constitute seven 
equations  in  eight unknowns: 
The  last equality of (38)  provides an  eighth and  determining equation.  The 
solutions for q and 8  are as  follows. 
where 
2pl(l-azbl>C(al+q>(bl+R>+bl(l+a~)l~~ 
8 = ...................................................... 
(1-azbl )C(l-azbl  >+2pl  bl  (l+a28)lu%+(bl+B)2u~+(l+a2B)zu< 
8  will take the sign of  (1-a2bl). 
In  the simplifying case  of (1-a2bl)=0  (or,  with identical 
consequences,  u:=O),  8  equal  s  zero and 
If,  further,  b,=a,=l,  then 
2  2  222  q=  Cuq-a  ox  I /ux=uq  /ura  . 
This last result is reminiscent of Poole's analysis of a fixed-price IS-LM 
model  under  comparable  assumptions  about  the elasticity of  demand  for  goods 
with respect to the interest rate.  The  output-stabilizing policy provides  for 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper
Best available copy-23- 
a money  supply with interest rate elasticity that has  a  lower  bound  of  -al 
and  no upper  bound.  It  is  directly related to  the ratio  of  money  demand 
variance to  commodity  demand  variance.  q decreases one-for-one with increases 
in al. 
The  output-stabi  1 i  zi  ng  response of the money  supply to  commodity  supply 
shocks,  pl, is  of indeterminate  sign.  However,  even if p,  is 
positive,  money  will respond  negatively to  observed output  shocks  when  the 
indirect effects via interest rate changes  are considered.' 
The  final-form equations for total output,  the price level,  and  the 
interest rate are  shown  below.  J,  q,  and  8 are as  given in (A.141,  (39), 
and  (40),  respectively. 
i  yt={l-8Cal+q+a2bl  (1-8)  lJ}~~+E"?~pls~-~-l3b~  ( 1-8)Jqt+13(al+q)Jlt  (43) 
pt=-[al+q+a2bl  (1-8)1J~~-2(p~  /R)E~-~ 
-E(2/B)+(al+a2bl+q)b;'  ( l+al+q)-I IC?=~~;E~-  i+bl  (1-8)Jqk+(al+q)Jlt  (44) 
Rt=-(1-a,bl 
+{(al+q>-'Ca2PI-pl-(2+a~)(p1/B~l-(Pl/bl~~l-a2bl~~l+al+q~~1}~~~2p~  '-I)  ~t-i 
+(bl+B)J~t+(l+a,O)J~+(l/bl~~?~lP~~t~i  (45) 
VII.  Firm Output Stabilization Policy 
Although output determination under  the wage-contracting scheme  is 
necessarily Pareto-suboptimal, it  is not clear that a policy to  minimize 
economy-wide  output fluctuations will improve  economic  welfare.  Several  other 
criteria would  seem  more  adequate  in  measuring the welfare losses from wage 
stickiness.  The  first, dealt with in this section,  is the variance of  firm, 
as  opposed  to  economy-wide,  output. If  workers  and  firms dislike variations 
in  their own  output and  employment more  than they dislike variations in 
aggregate output and  employment,  then economic  welfare  will be  higher under  a 
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policy aimed at stability of  output at the firm  level. 
The primary difference between policies designed to stabilize firm output 
and those designed to stabilize aggregate output is in the policy response to 
observed supply, pl.  In the aggregate output policy, PI  is chosen so 
that the effect of last period's supply innovation on economy-wide output is 
zero,  or dytldst-,=0.  Given that the effect  on output of group one is 
dy, ,ld~,-~=p,  >O,  this necessarily requires dy2  ,Id&,-  l=-pl  <O,  since 
(in  view of (5))  dy, is a simple average of dy,,  and dy,,.  Thus, the 
aggregate output policy uses its power to  decrease group two output, in 
response to positive supply shocks in  t-1, by a magnitude equal  to the neces- 
sary increase in group one output.  With regard  to supply shocks, then, such a 
policy succeeds in stabilizing aggregate output partly by destabilizing 
firm-level  output.  Last period's supply shock, E,-,,  which unavoidably 
caused y,,  to vary, has now caused y,, to vary as well, via an excessively 
deflationary policy response.  A less countercyclical response to  supply 
shocks, or a numerically higher PI,  is appropriate for firm-level output 
stabilization.  The appropriate response will have the effect of allowing 
enough deflation to  offset the effects of the supply shock on group two firms' 
output decisions. 
This policy is derived in the following way.  An appropriate measure of the 
variance of output for a typical firm over a contract interval, during which a 
firm will  have one period as a group one firm, and another period as a group 
two firm, is ECy,  ,-Ey,  ,I2+ECy2  ,-Ey2  ,IL.  Using the relevant 
equations among (25) and  (26),  and rearranging, 
ECy,  t-Ey,  t12+ECy2t-Ey2  t12=p:(l+p:)/(l-p~)l~~ 
+[(fill3  ,+PI  )2~g+(6n32  )'0:+(8n3;)~&1 
+2[(fin3,+1  >2a:+(~~3  5)2~:+(~n3b)  'o~I.  (46) 
This expression is the sum of  three components.  First, p:(l+p:  )l(l-p~)o~ 
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is  a constant,  or deadweight  term,  and  can  be  ignored in  policy choice.  A 
second  component  involves the terms  with 1131, 113,,  and  1133, and  is 
reduced  to  zero if 
RII3 I+~I=O,  8fl32=0,  Rn33=0-  (47) 
(Comparing  (47)  with (36),  it  is seen  that n31  differs between  firm and 
economy-wide  output policies,  but II3r and  1133 are  identically zero.) 
These,  in  conjunction with the relevant equations  among  (A.10>,  imply 
pl=pl C(ar/2)-(1/B)-(aI+q){[(l-pl  )/Rl-(112)-[pl  (al+a2bl+q)/2bl  (l+al+q)l}l 
p2=p2 >0,  p3=-p3(al+q)/bl  <0.  (48) 
It  remains  to determine q.  The  third component  of  firm  variance, 
[2(BI134+1  )20~+2(81135)2+2(&)21,  is  equal  to  2ECyt-E,-  ly,lz.  Given  the 
Gaussian  error structure,  this component  is  minimized if the policy vector is 
such  that condition  (38)  of  the previous  section is  fulfilled.  Then,  (38), 
(471,  (231,  and  the relevant six equations from  (A.10)  and  (A.12)  can  be 
solved for q and  8.  This condition,  in  conjunction with the above 





Cr=-bl (1-arb  >o~-bl~(bl+B)o~ 
C3=CB(l-a,bl  >+pl  b,  (l+a,B)l(1-a2bl  )o~+(bl+B)2~~+(l+a2B)2~i 
2  C4=-(1-a,bl  ~bl(l+al)o,-blB(bl+B)~~+alR(l+a,R)~~ 
Cs=-bl (1-a, bl  )o~+B(l+a,B)oi 
Cb=pl(l-arbl >(bl+B>o~.  (49) 
In  the simplifying case of (1-a2bl)og=0,  then q is  given by  (41)  and  8 
is  zero,  precisely as  for the economy-wide  output stabilizing policy. 
In  comparison  with the economy-wide  output stabilizing policy,  the firm 
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output  stabilization policy is  characterized by  a (numerically)  higher value 
of  PI.  The  difference  between  these policies with regard to  q is  ambiguous. 
pr  is identical.  p3  differs only to  reflect any  differences in  q,  leaving 
the  total responses  of  money  to  a commodity  demand  shock,  dmt/dXt-,,  i>O, 
the  same. 
VIII.  Price Stabilization Policy 
Another  interesting form of  output stabilization is  minimizing the 
variance of deviations in  output from its full-information level.  This policy 
criterion has  been  advocated  by,  among  others,  Barro (1976)  and  McCallum and 
Whitaker  (1979).  The  full-information level of  output is that which would 
obtain if  price expectations  were  realized exactly.  If, barring unexpected 
inflation,  output is chosen  by  the firms in  an  optimal  manner,  then an 
appropriate measure  for the performance  of  an  economy  is the degree  to which 
output "tracks,"  or tends  to  match,  that optimal  level.  Supply-shock  effects 
on output may  be  appropriate responses  to changing opportunities,  especially 
to the extent that such  shocks  represent productivity shifts. 
The  variance of the deviation of  output from the full-information level  is 
minimized if the variances  of  price expectation errors over one- and 
two-period horizons are minimized.  If the variances of  price expectation 
errors over all horizons  are minimized,  then the policy is  unique and  is 
identical to the price stabilization policy.  This  same  policy also 
necessarily minimizes  the  variance of both real and  nominal  wages.  This 
section derives  the unique  price stabilization policy. 
The  price level has  minimum  feasible variance if the policy rule is such 
that,  given the observable  state of the economy,  the expectation of the price 
level  is its constant mean.  Formally,  select the q  and  {p,}?=l  for which 
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E:-  1 pt=ECpt lilt  l=O. 
This conditional  expectation is  composed  of two necessarily orthogonal 
components: 
E:-lpt=Et-lpt+CE:-lpt-Et-lptl.  (51  > 
The  first  of these  terms  can  be  reduced  to  a value of zero only if  the effect 
of t-1  disturbances on  pt is removed.  It is clear from inspection of (13) 
that this requires 
n31=n32=n33=0.  (52) 
(52)  and  the relevant equations among  (A.10)  imply 
pl=(pllbl)(al+arbl+q)>O,  p2=p2>0, and  ~.t~=-p~(a~+q)Ib,<O.  (53) 
Given  (531,  it  is  readily seen  from the last three equations  of  (A.10)  that 
n37=&8=n39=0.  Therefore,  the effects of a1 1 past shocks  on  pt are 
eliminated.  The  first term on  the right-hand side of (51>,  Et-,pt,  is  made 
equal  to  zero and  prices are rendered nonautocorrelated. 
Condition (52)  and  the definition of 0,  (23),  imply 
8=0. 
The  second  term in  the conditional expectation  (51)  can  be  reduced  to 
zero, 
CE:-lpt-Et-  lptl=O,  (55) 
by  appropriate choice of  q.  (55)  implies,  given the stochastic assumptions, 
(lo),  that 
COVC(pt-Et-  lpt),  (Rt-Et-  1 Rt)  (56) 
Then,  (54),  (56),  and  the six relevant equations  from (A.10)  and  (A.12) 
constitute a system of eight equations  in the eight unknowns, 
{n34,  n3.5,  n3b,  n54,  n55,  n56,  q,  0)- 
The  solution for q is 
-(al+a2bl )(l-a2bl )o;+bl  (bI+B)o-f,-al (l+a2B)o: 
which completes  the characterization of the price stabilization policy. 
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The  sign of q is  ambiguous  and  will depend  strictly and  directly on  the 
numerator  of the right-hand side of (57).  It  is  easy  to  imagine  structures 
with either positive or negative values  for q  arising from a price stabilizing 
policy.  The  particularly simple case  of a,=bl=l  has 
q=  (1+B)(o~-ala:)/20:  >O iff  oG/o:>al.  (58) 
Interestingly,  this sign condition for q under  the price stabilization policy 
is identical to that of the output stabilization policy with a,=bl=l. 
However,  the scale or magnitude of q  is smaller or larger in the price policy 
relative to the output policy,  as  (1+0)/2  is  more  or less than unity, 
respectively. 
The  minimum price-level  variance attainable is 
Min  ECpt-Ept 12=C(al+q+a2bl >2&+b~o~+(al+q)20:lJ2. 
The  final-form  equations  for total output,  the price level,  the interest 
rate,  and  the money  stock are  shown  below.  J,  q,  and  8 are as  given by 
(A.141,  (541,  and  (571,  respectively. 
The  final form for the money  stock calls for positive responses  of  money 
to commodity  supply and  money  demand  shocks,  and negative responses  to 
commodity demand  shocks.  All of the signs of the total derivatives in  the 
final  form are of  determinate  signs,  except  dRt/dst,  whose  sign depends 
on whether  a,bl  exceeds  unity.  The  interest rate always  falls in  response 
to observed  supply shocks  (dR,/d~~-~,  i>O)  and  always  rises in  response 
to demand  shocks,  even  contemporaneously  (dRt/dX,-i>O,  for nonnegative i). 
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An  example  structure illustrates the workings  of the model  economy  under 
various policies.  It is specified by  the following  set of values  for the 
structural  parameters. 
2  {  al=2,  az=2/3,  bl=l,  D=1;  p,=.8,  i=1,2,3;  o,=l,  u:=5,  o<=2  ) 
The  value of a,  implies,  for example,  that an  increase in the nominal 
interest rate from 5  percent  to  6  percent  would,  for given levels of income 
and  prices,  lower  real money  demand  by  approximately 1.9  percent.  A  value of 
a,  somewhat  less than one  is suggested by  a priori theorizing on  the 
transactions demand  for money.  The  commodity  supply and  demand  elasticities 
of  unity were  chosen  merely because,  of  all (equally arbitrary) values,  they 
are the most  straightforward choices.  (Econometric  evidence  currently 
available does  not provide direct knowledge  of  supply and  demand 
elasticities.)  The  relative sizes of the disturbances  attempted to  give 
considerable scope  to  demand-side  influences on  output,  and  to  allow for a 
relatively unstable money  demand  function. 
Table  2 presents  the policy parameters  and  some  measures  of the system's 
resulting cyclical  behavior  under  the policies satisfying the four policy 
criteria.  The  signs of  coefficients in  the final  forms  are displayed in  table 
3.  The  example  is free of counterintuitive anomalies  that might occur  with 
other numerical  structures or with arbitrary policies. 
Interesting features of the example  are that stabilization of firm-level 
output calls for a positive response  of  money  to  lagged  supply  shocks  and  a 
positive correlation between  money  and  output.  Under  the policy to  stabilize 
prices,  which also minimizes  output deviations from the full-information 
level, money  will respond even more  strongly to  supply  shocks,  resulting 
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TABLE  2 
OUTCOMES  UNDER  ALTERNATIVE  POLICIES 
IN  THE  EXAMPLE  STRUCTURE 
Policies Designed  to  Stabilize: 
Pol i  cy  Economy-Wi de 
Parameters  Money  Output  Firm Output  Price Level 
Correlation Between 
Money  and  Output  -  -.33  +. 14  +.59 
Variance of: 
Economy-Wi  de 
Output  2.43  1.80  1.96  2.44 
Firm Output
1  3.22  2.44  2.12  2.40 
Pri  ces  15.47  12.86  3.69  0.62 
Real  Wages'  2.22  1.84  0.88  0.62 
Money  0  26.91  24.42  36.00 
Interest Rate  3.26  4.33  4.81  5.86 
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Best available copyTABLE 3:  RESPONSES  OF  ENDOGENOUS  VARIABLES  TO  DISTURBANCE  INNOVATIONS  UNDER  ALTERNATIVE  POLICIES 
DISTURBANCE  INNOVATION  and Period of Occurrence 
POLICY  CRITERION  COMMODITY  SUPPLY  MONEY  DEMAND  COMMODITY  DEMAND 
Endogenous  Vari  abl  e  t  t-1  t-2  t  t-1  t-2  t  t-1  t-2 
CONSTANT  MONEY 
Output 
Pri  ces 
Interest Rate 
ECONOMY-NIDE 
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in a correlation of +.59  between money and output.  This policy actually 
increases gross, economy-wide output variance relative to a constant-money 
policy, reflecting the importance of supply shocks for output behavior, 
despite the relative smallness of supply variance compared to demand and money 
demand variance.  However, the price-stabilization policy actually reduces 
firm output variance relative to the policy that stabilizes economy-wide 
output, illustrating the conflict between stability of  aggregate output versus 
firm output. 
The effect of private agents' use of the information content of the 
interest rate on output behavior is relatively slight in this example.  Under 
a constant money policy, the effect of current supply innovations, 
dytlds,,  is virtually unaffected,  taking the value  .529 if  agents do not 
use R, versus  .534 if  they do.  The effect of money demand innovations, 
dyt/dq,,  is -.I76 if  agents do not use R, and -.203 if they do.  The 
effect of demand innovations, dy,/dX,, is lowered from  .353 to .331 if 
agents use the interest rate.  The behavior of prices and interest rates, like 
that of  output, is only slightly modified by the alternative assumptions about 
use of  current information. ' 
Output objectives, either local or global, require somewhat different 
values for policy parameters depending on whether agents use the information 
in the interest rate, but the behavior of the controlled system is largely 
unaffected.  For example, the economy-wide output stabi  1  ization pol  icy is (q, 
p,,  p2,  p3)  = (1.44, -.66, .8,  -2.76)  if  agents do not use the 
information in the interest rate, compared with  (.92, -.82, .8, -2.34)  if  they 
do.  Similarly, the firm-level output stabilization policy is  (q, PI, 
p2,  p3)  = (1.44, 1.31, .8,  -2.76)  if  private agents do not use the 
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information in  the interest rate,  compared  with (1  -16,  1.16,  .8,  -2.53)  if 
they do.  Price,  output,  and  ex  ante real  interest rate behavior  is  entirely 
unaffected  by private use  of the information content of the  interest rate, 
given that the policy rule is  chosen  appropriately.  Nominal  interest rate 
behavior  is  modified by private use of the  information content of the  interest 
rate,  but the modification is slight if  8  is reasonably  close to  zero.  The 
response of the nominal  interest rate to  any  contemporaneous  innovation  is 
(1-8)  times greater if agents  do  not use  the  interest rate than if they do, 
where  8 is the updating coefficient when  agents  do  use  the  interest rate to 
update  expectations.  In the example  structure,  the relevant values of 8  are 
.15  and  .08  in the aggregate-level  output and  firm-level output stabilization 
policies,  so  that the contemporaneous  responses  of the interest rate to shocks 
are reduced by  15  and  8  percent,  respectively, if  private agents  ignore  the 
information  in the interest rate.  As  is  always  the case  under  any  policy 
objective,  innovations in  period t have  exactly the  same  effect on  all 
endogenous  variables in  subsequent  periods t+j,  j>O,  regardless of  whether 
agents  use  the  interest rate. 
If the price stabilization policy is chosen,  then the future price 
expectation is its unconditional  mean  and  therefore cannot  change  with current 
shocks,  even if the  latter are known.  Therefore,  variations  in  the interest 
rate,  while they continue  to  be  informative about  current shocks,  are 
uninformative  about  future prices,  so  8=0.  Consequently, if  the policy 
authorities choose  to  stabilize the price level,  then allowing private agents 
to  observe  the current interest rate has  no effect on  expectations,  and  hence 
no  effect on  the behavior of any  endogenous  variables or on  the appropriate 
policy rule parameters. 
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While  use  of contemporaneous  information is  an  important  and  problematic 
theoretical  issue,  the analysis here  suggests  that its  policy implications may 
not be  quantitatively important.  Indeed,  if the objectives are  limited to 
price stabilization,  real  wage  stabilization,  and  stabilization of output 
around  its full-information level,  then policy authorities need  not concern 
themselves  with the  issue  (assuming  they know  the economic  parameters  and 
variances),  because  the appropriate policy rule is  invariant to  whether  or not 
private agents use  contemporaneous  information. 
The  analysis of this article reaffirms the conventional  effectiveness of 
money  supply responses  to the current interest rate,  q,  and  responses  to the 
lagged state of the economy,  p, in  a model  with two-period wage  stickiness, 
even if private agents  use  the information content of the nominal  interest 
rate to form rational expectations.  Thus,  neither superior  information of the 
policymaker  relative to  private agents nor  irrational expectations are 
necessary  to  make  both q and  p relevant,  unless perfectly flexible wages  and 
prices are  assumed. 
This article also analyzes  a conflict between  stabilization of total 
output,  aggregate output,  and output relative to  its perfect-foresight 
level--a conflict that arises in the presence  of supply  shocks.  Stabilization 
of  output around  its full-information level,  rather than  its  unconditional 
mean,  may  be  more  appropriate and  is likely to  imply a positive correlation 
between money  and  output.  The  policy rule that stabilizes output around  its 
full-information level  has  the additional  advantage  of being consistent  with 
minimization of  price and  real wage  variances.  Firm-output stabilization may 
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also  require positive money-supply responses to supply shocks.  Hence, while 
multiperiod wage stickiness provides a conventional mechanism for the 
effectiveness of pol  icy  (both  q and p),  it does not necessari  ly,  or even 
probably, provide a persuasive rationale for countercyclical  monetary policy, 
if  the latter is interpreted as a negative correlation between money and 
output. 
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Append i  x 
This appendix  contains details of the derivation of the  solution to  the 
model.  Some  intermediate results are referred  to  in  the  text in  proofs of 
propositions  and  derivations of policies satisfying various  criteria.  The  set 
of ten equations  {(11),(12),(13),(14),(15),(16),(17),(18),(23),(24)} 
constitutes  the trial solution.  Then  certain identities among  the parameters 
of  the trial solution are implied by  the  structural  equations  (31,  (6),  (81, 
and  (91,  and  the accounting identity (4).  The  first  two  sets of identities, 
numbered  (A.1)  and  (A.21,  are implied by  the output supply  equations  (3). 
(A.3)  is implied by  the money  demand  equation,  (8); (A.4)  is implied by  the 
aggregate  demand  equation,  (6);  (A.5)  is implied by  the money  supply  function, 
(9); and  (A.6)  is implied by  the accounting  identity,  (4). 
(A. 1 ) 
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These identities can  be  solved for the undetermined coefficients  of the trial 
solution, the 17s. 
Total  output coefficients: 
no=a+ko 




ns=-Rbl  (1-B)J 
n,=B(al+q)J 
n,=-(B2/2b,  )~(a,+a~b~+q)~-b~p~  ]GI 
n,=-(B2/2)(p2-p2  >(al+a2bl+q)G2 
ns=(RL/2bl  )(al+a2bl+q)Cp3(al+q)+blp31G3 
Group one output: 









nl  ,=o 
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n2  o=a 
n2  l=PI-28(l+al+q)Cpl(al+a2bl+q)-blp~  ]GI 
11~  *=-  28p,bl  (l+al+q)G2 
r1~~=28(l+a~+q)Cp~(a~+q)+b~p~lG~ 
n,4=l-B[al+q+a2bl  (l-WJ 
I12s=-Bbl(l-8)J 
n,,=R(a,+q)J 
n,,=(8*/b1 )~~~(a~+a,b,+q)*-b~p~  ]GI 
n28=p282(al+a2bl+q)G2 
n29=-(82/bl  )(al+a2bl+q)[p3(a~+q)+b~p3]G3  (A.  9) 
(A. 10) 
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(A. 11 
Gi={Cl+(al+q)(l-pi >l~~(al+a2bl+q)+2bl(l+al+ql}1,  i=1,2,3,  (A. 13) 
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1.  Sargent  and  Wallace  did not derive the output stabilizing value of q or 
analyze  its  dependence on  the  structure.  Instead,  they contrasted  strict 
money-supply rules (e.g.,  money  supply  rules with q=O)  with interest rate 
rules  (e.g.,  Rt=f(St-,>>.  One  important result was  that prices and  the 
money  stock were  indeterminate  under  the  latter rule.  As  argued  in  Hoehn 
(1987>, an  interest rate rule is  not a feasible policy option in  models  such 
as  that of  Sargent  and  Wallace.  In later sections of this article, a  complete 
analysis of the output-stabilizing and  other objective-seeking values  of q and 
their dependence  on  the  structure  is  provided. 
2.  Other  important  papers  contributing to  analysis of contemporaneous, 
heterogeneous  information in  models  with a credit market  include Barro  (1980), 
Weiss  (1980),  and  King (1982).  The  latter provides an  excellent discussion of 
the general  implications of heterogeneous  current  information for the policy 
effectiveness proposition in flexible-price models,  as  well  as  some  fully 
worked-out numerical  examples. 
3.  Dotsey  and  King  (1986)  also argued,  in  effect,  that the behavior of  output 
and  other variables depends  on  whether  q  is  finite  or infinite, and  identified 
the latter case  with an  interest rate rule (e.g.,  Rt is  a strict function of 
St-l,  as  in  Rt=f(St-l)).  But  Hoehn  (1987)  argues  that interest rate 
rules are  infeasible in  models  such  as  theirs and  that policies with infinite 
q cannot  be  made  operational  in  any  model.  In  any  case,  variations in  q are 
irrelevant in the flexible-price model  of Dotsey and  King,  so  long as  q  is 
finite.  The  discussion in the  text of this article rules out infinite q. 
4.  This  nonuniqueness  of the output-stabilizing policy could have  been 
eliminated if, as  in the present  analysis,  the policy rule's arguments  exclude 
elements  that augment  the minimal  state vector,  S,  beyond  those  necessary  to 
achieve policy objectives.  Then,  nonzero p would  have  been  ruled out and 
the conclusion  would  have  been  that q is  relevant for output while p is 
irrelevant for output. 
5.  McCallum (1987)  argues  convincingly that Keynesian  sticky-wage models  that 
incorporate equilibrium wage  dynamics  represent a  significant advance  over 
earlier models  that did not. 
6.  The  formulation of the real ex  ante interest rate employed  here  is similar 
to  that of  Canzoneri,  Henderson,  and  Rogoff  (1983).  Indeed,  the updating 
superscript,  "+",  is taken  from their notation.  However,  they use 
EL-,pt  for the current price term,  whereas I  have  assumed  that 
demanders  know  the current price they pay  when  making purchasing decisions. 
The  economy-wide  price level,  pt, is the appropriate current price term for 
aggregate demand  if agents  know  the price they pay when  making  purchasing 
decisions,  even if  individuals' purchasing prices differ.  Although agents  are 
allowed to  know  their purchasing price, it  is assumed  for simplicity that they 
do not use  that information  to update  the future  price expectation.  This 
assumption  is  a reasonable  approximation if individual prices are highly 
variable so  that they contain  little  global  information.  The  assumption  could 
be  relaxed only in the context of a disaggregate  model  that accounts  for 
differences in  information  available to  agents  in  different markets.  Such  a 
model  requires a set of  assumptions  about  local markets,  intermarket trading, 
factor  mobility, market  clearing,  and  so  forth.  A  special  problem is that 
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behavior  involving wage  stickiness.  Such  an  analysis,  while desirable,  is 
beyond  the  scope  of this article, and  does  not seem  particularly necessary for 
an  analysis of the use  of global  information from the interest rate,  which  is 
the most  important  source of current information available to  monetary 
authorities. 
King (1982,  1983)  and  Dotsey  and King (1983)  constructed  disaggregate 
market-clearing models  along lines suggested  by  Lucas  and  Barro.  Their 
analysis focused on  the effects of  private agents'  use  of idiosyncratic 
information from local prices in  generating a kind of policy effectiveness 
from  feedback  to the lagged state of  the economy,  g.  Dotsey  and  King  (1  986) 
also analyze  a model  in  which  some  agents  know  the full state,  other agents 
know  only the lagged state,  and  a single commodity  market  clears.  Again,  they 
find g  relevant for output via a heterogeneous  information mechanism, 
although little  can  be  said about  the influence of p other than  that it 
exi  sts. 
A  heterogeneous  information mechanism  is  not incorporated into the present 
analysis for technical reasons,  but it  might  coexist with the mechanisms  of 
policy effectiveness  analyzed  in  this article,  in  a fully developed 
disaggregate  version of the macroeconomic  model  employed. 
7.  In  particular,  the trial solution for the endogenous  expectation of the 
price level at time t formed  at time t-2,  Et-,pt,  necessarily involves  terms 
in E~-ZU~-~,  Et-Z~t-l,  and  E,-,X,-~,  even if these  are not included in  the 
state vector.  This fact is  apparent  from equation  (18)  of the trial 
solution,  in  which  l131Et-Z~t-l,  I132Et-2~t-I,  and  l133Et-2~t-1  will 
appear  even if ll,,,  ll,,,  and  1139 are set  to  zero,  as  would be  the case if 
Et-2~t-l, Et-Z~t-l, and  Et-zxt-l  were  excluded from St. 
8.  For  example,  if 8=2,  aI=5,  a2=213, and  bl=1/2,  then dytldst-, approaches 
-2.84  as  pl approaches  unity. 
9.  For  an  example  in  which pl is  positive,  consider  a,=b,=l,  al=5,  8=112, 
{pi=1/2;  i=1,2,3),  o:=10,  and  &=l.  Then  optimal  policy is given by 
{q,  pl, p2, p3)  =  {  5,  3,  112,  -51,  which  involves p,>O.  In this example, 
dmt/det-l=  pl+(dRt/ds.-l>q=-3.06,  showing  that money  contracts in  response  to  the 
observed  (t-1)  supply  shock. 
10.  Ironically,  this economy  would,  under  a constant money  policy,  produce 
output typically closer to  the natural  rate if private agents  did not use  the 
interest rate to  update  inflation expectations.  The  variance of  deviations of 
output from its natural rate is  raised by  .016  as  agents  use  the interest 
rate. 
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